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lvin Plantinga claims that belief in God can be taken 
as properly basic, without appealing to arguments or 
relying on faith.  Traditionally, any account of the 
knowledge for the existence of God has gone 
something like this: 
 (1) Person P believes the statement S “God exists” is true. 
 (2) The statement S “God exists” is true. 
 (3) P has sufficient evidence for the truth of the statement 
        S “God exists”. 
 _______________________________ 
Thus, (4) Person P knows that God exists. 
Plantinga maintains that any formal process of justification, 
supplied by premise (3), is unnecessary in giving one knowledge 
to the existence of God.  He claims one can bypass premise (2) 
and (3) and go directly from premise (1) to the conclusion.  
Plantinga maintains that “belief in God is properly basic - that is, 
such that it is rational to accept it without accepting it on the 
basis of any other propositions or beliefs at all.”1 Thus, it is 
rational to believe in the existence of God without appeal to 
arguments or appeal to faith.  In other words, we can just „know‟ 
God exists.  Plantinga claims “a believer is entirely rational, 
entirely within his epistemic rights in starting with belief in God, 
in accepting it as basic, and in taking it as premise for argument 
to other conclusions.”2   
 But, as Plantinga asks, “what is the status of criteria for 
knowledge, or proper basicality, or justified belief?”3  To answer 
this, Plantinga rejects the epistemology of both foundationalism 
and coherence theories.  That is, he claims (1) “being self-evident, 
or incorrigible, or evident to the senses is not a necessary 
condition of proper basicality”4 and (2) “belief in God is... 
rational to accept it without accepting it on the basis of any other 
propositions or beliefs at all.”5  Instead, Plantinga accepts a 
version of weak foundationalism that relies on a notion of proper 
basicality, and claims, “A weak foundationalist is likely to hold 
that some properly basic beliefs are such that anyone who 
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accepts them, knows them.” 6  
 But how reliable is this account to give us knowledge, 
especially of the existence of God?  While responding to an 
objection against his own theory of proper basicality (The Great 
Pumpkin Objection), Plantinga develops an account of epistemic 
warrant upon the notion of having proper functioning cognitive 
equipment.  In light of this theory, Keith Lehrer has raised 
several objections against Plantinga‟s account of epistemic 
warrant.  In this paper, I will look at Plantinga‟s account of 
epistemic warrant and Lehrer‟s objections to Plantinga‟s theory.  
Finally, after having evaluated Lehrer‟s objections and 
Plantinga‟s responses, I will maintain that Plantinga still has not 
satisfactorily established a viable epistemology that accounts for 
the existence of God. 
 
(I) The Great Pumpkin Objection 
 This objection asks, “If we say that belief in God is 
properly basic, will we not be committed to holding that just 
anything, or nearly anything can properly be taken as basic?”7  In 
other words, since Plantinga makes the claim that the knowledge 
of God‟s existence can be taken as properly basic without any 
reference to other beliefs that we have, then does that mean that 
someone can hold, as properly basic, beliefs that other “bizarre 
aberration(s)” also exist?  As Plantinga asks, “What about the 
belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween?  Could I 
take that as basic? And if I can‟t, why can I properly take belief in 
God as basic?”8   
 This objection recognizes the difficulty in maintaining 
knowledge of God‟s existence while appealing to a system that 
lacks either internal and external justification or coherence. If 
knowledge is simply a matter of holding a true belief about 
something, then why is it not possible to claim beliefs about 
things like „the Great Pumpkin exists‟ as knowledge?   Plantinga 
maintains that holding such a claim is mistaken.  But why?  At 
first Plantinga responds, by claiming that according to reformed 
epistemologists, “certain beliefs are properly basic in certain 
circumstances; [while] those same beliefs may not be properly 
basic in other circumstances.”9  Thus Plantinga is making some 
sort of distinction between which beliefs count as being properly 
basic from those that do not.  Here, Plantinga relies on the use of 
the phrase “in certain circumstances”.  In certain circumstances, 
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it is rational for a belief to be taken as properly basic; but what 
are those „certain circumstances‟?  Plantinga seems to know what 
these certain circumstances are, but he is not effective at 
elucidating what they are.  By what theory does Plantinga 
propose to outline those circumstances?   
 Plantinga contends that “What the Reformed 
epistemologist holds is that there are widely realized 
circumstances in which belief in God is properly basic.”10  
However, this response does not answer the question about a 
criterion of „circumstances‟.  While maintaining a weak 
foundationalist account of proper basicality, Plantinga must still 
accept the burden of being accountable for some explanation of 
his theory.  That is, he must be able to demonstrate how, under 
these „certain circumstances‟ it is possible to take the existence of 
God as properly basic.  To this objection, Plantinga claims, 
 
Must one have such a criterion before one can 
sensibly make any judgements - positive or 
negative - about proper basicality?  Surely not. 
Suppose I do not know of a satisfactory substitute 
for the criteria proposed by classical 
foundationalism; I am nevertheless entirely within 
my epistemic rights in holding that certain 
propositions in certain conditions are not properly 
basic.11 
 
But as Lehrer claims, “To raise objections against a theory is, 
however, not sufficient in philosophy.  One must show that one 
can construct a theory that avoids the objections and, moreover, 
that clarifies the underlying problem.”12  That is, while 
Plantinga‟s account of proper basicality is a response to classical 
foundationalism, it still has not given a convincing answer to the 
question, “How do we know that God exists?”   Plantinga‟s 
account of proper basicality maintains, 
 
the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, 
broadly speaking, inductive.  We must assemble 
examples of beliefs and conditions such that the 
former are obviously properly basic in the latter, 
and examples of beliefs and conditions such that 
the former are obviously not properly basic in the 
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latter.  We must then frame hypotheses as to the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of proper 
basicality and test these hypotheses by reference to 
those examples.13  
The way that Plantinga proposes this criterion is by (1) framing a 
picture of knowledge and (2) using this to account for how we 
can have knowledge in the existence of God.   
 The first of these two claims is very ambitious, for 
Plantinga attempts to describe a picture for a theory of 
knowledge. Plantinga‟s theory is:  “The correct picture of 
knowledge, then, goes as follows: a belief constitutes knowledge, 
if it is true, and if it arises as a result of the right use and proper 
functioning of our epistemic capacities.”14  Here, Plantinga has 
developed three conditions for a belief to be considered as 
knowledge:  (1) the belief must be true, (2) the belief must arise 
from our epistemic capacities functioning properly, and (3) the 
true belief, derived from our epistemic capacities functioning 
properly, must result from our capacities under the right use.  
This definition will later be developed into an epistemic system 
of warrant, and what these three conditions mean exactly will be 
discussed in that account of warrant. 
 
(II) Warrant and Proper Functionality 
 In his book Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga 
develops his „picture of a theory of knowledge‟ that was 
presented in his paper On Reformed Epistemology, into a 
modified account of epistemic warrant.  But what exactly does 
warrant do?  As Jonathan Kvanvig claims, “Warrant is thus that 
elusive property sought by epistemologists for centuries that 
distinguishes true belief from knowledge.”15  Further he claims 
that “warrant is that property, enough of which, that is sufficient 
for knowledge.”16  So, certainly we would hope that an account 
that attempts to define knowledge, will be able to distinguish 
mere belief in God from knowledge of God.  Plantinga‟s account 
of warrant is as follows: 
 
“A belief has warrant for you if and only if (1) the 
cognitive faculties involved in the production of B 
are functioning properly...(2) your cognitive 
environment is sufficiently similar to the one for 
which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) the 
WARRANT, PROPER FUNCTION 
50 
triple of design plan governing the production of 
the belief in question involves, as purpose or 
function, the production of true beliefs; and (4) the 
design plan is a good one:  that is, there is a high 
statistical or objective probability that a belief 
produced in accordance with the relevant segment 
of the design plan in that sort of environment is 
true.”17 
 
 As was demonstrated earlier, this notion of „proper 
functionality‟ plays a very important role in Plantinga‟s 
epistemology.  It is with the concept of proper functionality that 
Plantinga introduces a condition of design into the properly basic 
system of belief.   Considering the four conditions that Plantinga 
has outlined, all of them rely on properly functioning cognitive 
faculties.  For one‟s cognitive faculties to be functioning properly, 
they must operate as they are designed to operate.  That is, for 
example, if you question whether your sense of vision is 
functioning properly, then you may rely on past experiences 
when you have known your vision to work properly and then 
adjust your present vision experiences according to those past 
vision experiences.  For example, if I am myopic and my eyesight 
is getting progressively worse, one day I might say to myself, “I 
think my eyesight is getting worse, perhaps I should get a 
stronger prescription to my glasses.”  I would be advised to 
focus my vision on objects that normally in the past have been 
relatively easy for me to focus on.  I would continue trying to 
focus my vision upon objects at different distances, different 
sizes, and different sources of light until I make note of all the 
variations between my past (better) vision and my new 
(degenerated) vision.  Thus, if I am able to tell that my sense of 
vision is not functioning properly, then I am perhaps not best 
equipped for making claims to knowledge of events that I cannot 
decipher visually.  For example, if my vision is bad, and I am the 
only witness to a murder, but did not get a good look at the 
murderer, then when a row of suspects are presented to me, I 
ought not to rely on just my visual accounts in deciding the guilt 
of a suspect.  Thus, under Plantinga‟s account, I could not take as 
properly basic the knowledge that any one person committed the 
murder, solely based on my visual experience.   
 Not only do we have to possess properly functioning 
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cognitive equipment, but our equipment must be functioning in 
an environment for which our faculties were designed.  That is, 
all of us with a good sense of hearing would find it most difficult 
to listen to our favorite music 60 feet under water and really 
make any sense out of it.  Likewise, our normal properly 
functioning environment for thinking is not a drug-induced 
state.  However, if we were to take an hallucinogenic or narcotic 
drug, then we would find it difficult to carry on the normal 
thoughts that we typically do when we are not under the 
influence of these drugs.  Thus, for beliefs to count as knowledge, 
not only must the right conditions of cognitive equipment 
(properly functioning as it is designed to operate) be met, but 
also that our equipment is in an environment that cooperates 
with our equipment functioning in the reliable and predictable 
way that it is supposed to.   
 The third and fourth conditions concern the production 
of true beliefs.  What is required in condition (3) is that the beliefs 
produced by the first two conditions, being met, are typically 
true beliefs.  This condition makes it so that our claims to true 
beliefs are reliable, predictable, and accurate.  That is, that we are 
used to having true beliefs as a result of our properly functioning 
equipment.  Condition (4) goes beyond the claim of individual 
true beliefs to see how well our beliefs correspond with reality.  
Again, the concern is over how reliably, and accurately we can 
predict our beliefs being with reality.  If the beliefs that we 
typically have in a certain environment are true, then we would 
be able to take those beliefs as properly basic. 
 
(III) Lehrer’s Critique 
 Keith Lehrer presents a critique against Plantinga‟s  
epistemology and his notion of proper functionality and 
warranted belief.  The critique asks whether proper functioning 
is enough to yield warrant, and, combined with true belief, 
knowledge.  In his objection, Lehrer tries to prove that proper 
functioning is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge.  
Lehrer gives two examples to illustrate this point.  The first of the 
two considers a man by the name of Mr. Truetemp.  Mr. 
Truetemp is the sufferer of an odd brain malady that requires the 
usage of medication to treat it.  Mr. Truetemp is only supposed 
to take this medication when his temperature exceeds 98 degrees.  
But of course, it is very difficult for him to monitor his 
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temperature all the time.  The risk of him not taking his 
temperature at appropriate moments, and thus failing to take his 
medication, could be fatal.  Thus, Mr. Truetemp‟s concerned 
doctor, along with several neural surgeons, discovered a way 
that Mr. Truetemp could regulate his body temperature without 
having to constantly take his temperature.  The doctors have 
made it possible to install a small device in the brain of people 
that is able to take the patient‟s body temperature and produce 
true beliefs about one‟s body temperature.  Thus, if the doctors 
could implant the device into Mr. Truetemp‟s brain and program 
the device to produce true beliefs once an hour, then Mr. 
Truetemp‟s life would become much more efficient by not 
having to worry about a fatal dysfunction caused by an 
excellerated body temperature.   
 Suppose they go through with the procedure and the 
operation is a success.  When Mr. Truetemp wakes up, and after 
being awake for a while, Mr. Truetemp claims, “You know, I am 
suddenly convinced that my temperature is 98 degrees, but I do 
not have the slightest idea why I believe that .”  Thus, the doctors 
conclude that this confirms that the device works, that is, it 
“worked just as it was designed to do and is functioning 
properly to produce true beliefs on the hour about the brain 
temperature of Mr. Truetemp.”18 
 Now, the problem that this poses for Plantinga is that Mr. 
Truetemp is having true beliefs about his temperature.  His 
beliefs are “produced by a device that is properly functioning to 
produce true beliefs as it was designed to do in the environment 
it was designed for.”19  But, “Mr. Truetemp does not know that 
his temperature is 98 degrees when he believes it is.”20  Thus,  
Mr. Truetemp‟s account fulfills Plantinga‟s account for warrant 
but it does not produce knowledge.  Thus, this objection 
demonstrates that proper functionality is not a sufficient 
condition for knowledge.  
 The second objection that Lehrer raises against Plantinga 
is the example of Ms. Prejudice.  Just as the previous example 
showed that proper functionality is not sufficient, this objection 
shows that proper functionality is not a necessary condition for 
knowledge.  This example demonstrates how a belief might arise 
from improper functioning (e.g. racial prejudice) but become 
warranted later by the acquisition of evidence.  Take for 
example, Ms. Prejudice.  Ms. Prejudice has a strong belief that 
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members of a race contract a certain disease because of their 
genetic makeup.  This, for her, demonstrates their racial 
inferiority, and her racial superiority.  Now, also take into 
consideration that Ms. Prejudice is a medical student and 
through her research comes to discover that the medical 
evidence for her prejudiced belief is strong.  In time, she becomes 
a very successful and respected medical research scientist, and 
she gets nominated to be on a research team to investigate the 
genetic nature of this elusive diease.  As circumstances permit, 
all of her fellow research colleagues know of her prejudice and 
determine that she will be a good member of the team because of 
her prejudice (that is, she will be the strongest opposition that 
they could possibly find).  But they also know of her strong 
convictions to science and medicine.  So, they are completely 
confident in her ability.   
 As the team‟s research develops, it becomes clearer that 
the evidence points to the claim that the disease is indeed caused 
by genetic makeup of the patient.  Thus, Ms. Prejudice becomes 
very careful with her evidence so that she cannot be charged 
with making conclusions based on her unwarranted belief.  
However, the evidence becomes overwhelming.  To the dismay 
of the other medical researchers, they all conclude that the 
evidence conclusively demonstrates that the disease is indeed 
derived from the genetics of the patient. Thus the evidence has 
been rigorously tested, but her belief that the disease is 
genetically caused is the result of her still very intense prejudice.  
That is, “After the investigation, her belief has warrant, all the 
warrant the matter admits of, and she knows that the disease is 
genetically caused.”21  But, “her belief is the product of an 
improperly functioning system of racial prejudice.”22   
 Again this example is a problem for Plantinga.  It 
demonstrates how one who has knowledge, true beliefs, and 
beliefs that are warranted does not arrive at one‟s beliefs via 
cognitive faculties functioning properly.  Therefore, with these 
two examples, Lehrer has demonstrated that proper functionality 
is neither necessary nor sufficient as a condition for knowledge. 
 
(IV) Plantinga’s Responses 
 The counterexample of Mr. Truetemp, Plantinga claims, 
does not pose a problem for his account of warrant.  Plantinga 
claims, that Mr. Truetemp has a belief that no one else has, 
WARRANT, PROPER FUNCTION 
54 
namely that he has beliefs about his temperature.  However, if he 
shared these beliefs with other people, they would think that he 
is mad.  That is, Mr. Truetemp is “constructed like other human 
beings and none of them have this ability; furthermore, everyone 
he meets scoffs or smiles at his claim that he does have it.”23  This 
accounts for a defeater in his system of beliefs.  That is, since 
these experiences are out of the ordinary of any properly 
functioning system, then this anomaly is enough to defeat his 
claims that he does indeed have knowledge of his temperature.   
 But how viable of a solution is this anyway?  It seems that 
all that is required to defeat Mr. Truetemp‟s “defeater” is for the 
doctors to simply explain to Truetemp what they had implanted 
in his brain and how it is supposed to function.  That is, they 
could explain what it is supposed to do, and under what 
conditions it is functioning properly to Mr. Truetemp.  However, 
if he knows the device is in his brain, does that follow that he 
now knows what his temperature is, as opposed to holding a 
true belief without knowledge?   According to Plantinga, if Mr. 
Truetemp believes that the device is indeed delivering true 
beliefs about his temperature then clearly, yes.  But, Mr. 
Truetemp never gets this opportunity to reflect about whether 
the belief is true or not, he just assents to it without ever 
wondering if it is caused in the right way.   
 On this point, Plantinga may want to claim that this can 
count as a special case of a cognitive process.  That is, the fact 
that I am simply and directly having a belief, Plantinga might 
ask whether one can “take this to be a special limiting case of 
cognitive faculties or belief-producing processes functioning 
properly?”24  Plantinga has therefore been willing to say that 
“this belief isn‟t exactly produced by a cognitive faculty, or at 
least by one of my cognitive faculties; but it is produced by a 
properly functioning cognitive process, and I [Plantinga] think 
that‟s sufficient.”25   
 But, wait a second.  In both of these objections, the agents 
are receiving true beliefs passively.  That is, they are not directly 
aware of the cause of their true beliefs, or of the „why‟ of their 
true beliefs.  They assent to their beliefs without determining if 
their beliefs are caused in the right way or if their cognitive 
equipment is working properly.   They lack justification.  But in 
the Mr. Truetemp example, Plantinga is quick to say that it does 
not count as warrant because of the lack of cognitive faculties, 
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but later would be committed to claiming that as long as it is 
caused by a cognitive process, then it can be warranted.  So, 
what‟s the difference?   
 Plantinga has not given a clear account of why he thinks 
one way or the other.  He has only suggested the latter is 
produced by a “properly functioning cognitive process”.  But so 
is the former.  That is, the process that Plantinga is referring to in 
the latter (receiving true beliefs) is also present in the former 
(receiving true beliefs).  I am not sure how Plantinga might try to 
respond to this.  However, in light of considering one agent 
superior over the other, with equal consideration of evidence, it 
is clear that he must respond to this. 
 
Conclusion 
 The problems that Plantinga is committed to responding 
to involve the same type of problems that he was originally 
responding to in the Great Pumpkin Objection.  I agree with Van 
Hook when he claims that Plantinga takes the Great Pumpkin 
Objection too lightly, and clearly from this paper, it has resulted 
in making vague statements about proper basicality.  Perhaps 
Plantinga needs to go back and reformulate his responses to the 
Great Pumpkin Objection, since that seems to be where his 
troubles begin.  Or perhaps Plantinga does after all have to 
concede to either the strong foundationalist or the coherence 
theorist, and place knowledge of God‟s existence on some 
foundation or coherence with other beliefs.   
 
Notes 
1 Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality:  Reason and 
Belief in God  (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) p. 72  
2 Ibid., p. 72 
3 Ibid., p. 75 
4 Alvin Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology” in Philosophy 
of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce 
Reichenbach, and David Basinger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)  
p. 320  
5 Plantinga and Wolterstorff, p. 72 
6 Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger.,  p. 317 
7 Plantinga and Wolterstorff,  p. 74 
8 Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger., p., 318 
9 Plantinga and Wolterstorff, p. 74 
10 Ibid., p. 74 
11 Ibid., p. 75 
12 Keith Lehrer, “Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence” in Warrant in 
WARRANT, PROPER FUNCTION 
56 
Contemporary Epistemology:  Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, ed. Jonathan 
Kvanvig (Lanham:  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996), p. 36 
13 Plantinga and Wolterstorff, p. 76 
14 Alvin Plantinga, “On Reformed Epistemology” in Philosophy of Religion: 
Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, 
and David Basinger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),  p. 336 
15 Kvanvig, p. viii 
16 Ibid., p. viii 
17 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 1993) p. 194 
18 Kvanvig, p. 32 
19 Ibid., p. 32 
20 Ibid., 32 
21 Ibid., p. 34 
22 Ibid., p. 34 
23 Ibid., p. 333 
24 Ibid., p. 338 
25 Ibid., p. 338 
 
Bibliography 
Lehrer, Keith; “Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence” in 
Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology:  Essays in Honor of Avlin 
Plantinga, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig (Lanham:  Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996) 
Plantinga, Alvin and Wolterstorff, Nicholas; Faith and Rationality:  
 Reason and Belief in God  (Notre Dame:  University of Notre 
 Dame Press, 1983)  
Plantinga, Alvin; Warrant and Proper Function (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 
Plantinga, Alvin; “On Reformed Epistemology” in Philosophy of Religion: 
Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce 
Reichenbach, and David Basinger (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 
Plantinga, Alvin; “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology” in 
Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson, 
William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996)  
 
 
JOSEPH CURTIS MILLER 
